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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall"
The United States Supreme Court was the center of the action in the
area of employment discrimination during the 2011 survey period.' The
most talked about decision was the Court's opinion in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes.2 The much-anticipated decision in Dukes was the most
significant opinion handed down by the Court in the area of employment
discrimination class actions since its 1982 decision in General Telephone
Co. v. Falcon,' and perhaps ever. The Court also continued to broaden
the scope of potential Title VII' retaliation actions with its decision in
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.5
As for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
court continued to hand down a large number of employment discrimination decisions, but virtually all of them were unpublished. In fact, the
court handed down only one published Title VII opinion during the

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2011. Cases arising under the following Federal statutes are
included: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment
discrimination law during the prior survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall,
Employment Discrimination,Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REv. 1125 (2011).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
3. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
5. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
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survey period, and only three published opinions in the employment
discrimination area overall.
I.
A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment. Several cases during the survey period
dealt with the issue of whether a plaintiff, as part of the initial prima
facie case showing, had presented sufficient evidence of a comparator
receiving more favorable treatment than the plaintiff-that is, "a
similarly situated"6 person not in the plaintiffs protected category who
received more favorable treatment than the plaintiff. For instance, in
Lane v. McKeithen,' the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether
the district court had abused its discretion in excluding from evidence
the plaintiff's alleged comparator evidence. The plaintiff brought a Title
VII' action alleging that he was not hired as a corrections officer at the
Bay County jail on account of his race. The defendant sheriff argued
that the plaintiff had not been hired because of his criminal background,
which included being charged with conspiracy to commit murder and
acting as an accessory after the fact. In support of his claim, the
plaintiff attempted to show that the defendant had hired a Caucasian
detention specialist who had been charged with aggravated manslaughter, although he was later acquitted. The district court granted
defendant's motion in limine, excluding this evidence.? On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court had not abused its
discretion in excluding this evidence, holding that there were "material
differences" between the detention specialist position that the alleged
comparator had applied for, and the corrections officer position that the
plaintiff had applied for.'0 In reaching its decision, the court relied
upon the prior decision in Maniccia v. Brown," where the court noted
that alleged comparators must be similarly situated in all relevant
respects to avoid "confusing apples with oranges.""

6. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).
7. 423 F. App'x 903 (11th Cir. 2011).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
9. Lane, 423 F. App'x at 904-05 (footnote omitted).
10. Id.
11. 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 1368; see also Summers v. City of Dothan, 444 F. App'x 346, 348 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding that summary judgment for employer was affirmed where conduct of alleged
comparator not "nearly identical" to conduct of the plaintiff).
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In stark contrast to Lane v. McKeithen, however, was the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,3 the court's only
published Title VII decision during the survey period. In this case, the
plaintiff, a Caucasian male, brought a "reverse" discrimination case
under Title VII and Section 1981" alleging that his former employer,
Lockheed-Martin Aeronautics Company, had discriminated against him
because of his race when it terminated his employment." The plaintiff
had worked as a supervisor at Lockheed-Martin's plant in Marietta,
Georgia." He had received a racially insensitive joke email entitled 'Top
Ten Reasons Why There are No Black NASCAR Drivers" and had
forwarded the joke email to his supervisor, without reporting it to the
Human Resources Department."
Following an investigation, the
plaintiff was terminated for violating Lockheed-Martin's zero tolerance
policy prohibiting workplace discrimination and harassment. In support
of his claim, the plaintiff presented evidence of two African American
non-supervisors at the Marietta facility who had violated the zero
tolerance policy by transmitting racially insensitive emails, but who
were only suspended for their conduct as opposed to terminated." In
granting summary judgment for Lockheed-Martin, the district court
found that the African American non-supervisors were not "similarly
situated" to the plaintiff."
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit ventured off into a totally
new and different direction. Although the court of appeals agreed with
the district court that the plaintiff had not presented valid comparator
evidence, indeed, nowhere in the court's lengthy decision is there any
reference to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Maniccia v. Brown,2 0 the
court of appeals nonetheless reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.2 Reasoning that "establishing the elements of the
McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and never was intended to be, the
sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion," the
court held that a plaintiff "will always survive summary judgment" if
there is the presentation of other "circumstantial evidence" creating a
"triable issue concerning the employer's discriminatory intent."22 In

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1323.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328.
Id.; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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this case, the crux of the other "circumstantial evidence" was evidence
that the defendant was very concerned about an ABC news report
critical of the defendant's Human Resources Department that was
scheduled to air shortly after the plaintiff was terminated.2 3 The court
of appeals concluded that this other circumstantial evidence precluded
summary judgment because a jury could have reasonably inferred that
the plaintiff had been fired because he was white.24 This case is
instructive because it is the type of case in which the Eleventh Circuit
has affirmed a summary judgment numerous times in the past, utilizing
the analysis described above (in other words, the plaintiffs failure to
present evidence of a "similarly situated" comparator). It remains to be
seen whether the court will deny future summary judgment motions
because of a plaintiff's presentation of alleged "other circumstantial
evidence," even where there is no valid evidence of a similarly situated
comparator.
2. Retaliation. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,25 the
Supreme Court continued its trend of significantly expanding the scope
of potential retaliation actions under Title VII. The plaintiff and his
fianc6e were both employed by the defendant, North American Stainless
(NAS). The plaintiffs fianc6e filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three weeks
later, NAS fired the plaintiff from his position. The plaintiff then
brought an action under Title VII, alleging that NAS had retaliated
against him because his fianc6e had filed an EEOC charge. 26 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that
Title VII "does not permit third party retaliation claims."" On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a three-judge
panel initially reversed the ruling, but after granting rehearing en banc,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court by a vote of ten to six."
The Supreme Court focused on two questions: (1) whether the
defendant's firing of the plaintiff constituted unlawful retaliation; and
(2) if it did, whether Title VII granted the plaintiff a cause of action.29
As to the first question, the Supreme Court, relying upon its prior
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,"o

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1331.
Id. at 1341.
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
Id. at 867.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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had "little difficulty" in deciding that a reasonable worker could have
been "dissuaded from engaging in protected activity" if she had known
that her filing of a charge would have resulted in her fianche being
fired." The "more difficult" question was the second one.32 However,
the Court held that Title VII's retaliation provision protects "any
33
plaintiff with an interest 'arguably . .. protected by the statutes.'
Concluding that the plaintiff did fall within the "zone of interests
protected by Title VII," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
finding that the plaintiff was "a person aggrieved with standing to
sue."
Two unpublished decisions within the survey period addressed the
issue of whether a plaintiff had adequately established causation, as
part of the initial prima facie showing required in retaliation cases. In
Williams v. Waste Management, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit, in
affirming summary judgment for a defendant, agreed with the district
court that a two-month gap between the protected conduct and the
adverse action against the plaintiff was not close enough to create an
inference of causation." Similarly, in Jones v. Flying J, Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit, again affirming summary judgment for a defendant,
agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had not established
causation, because in this instance there was no evidence that the
decision maker in the case, the individual terminating the plaintiff's
employment, had any knowledge of the plaintiff's protected conduct. 8

B. ProceduralIssues
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes," the Supreme Court brought an
abrupt halt to what likely was the most massive class action in the
history of Title VII jurisprudence. In this action, the district court
certified a class of approximately one and a half million plaintiffs, all of
whom were current and former female employees of Wal-Mart, who were
alleging that Wal-Mart's pay and promotion practices as exercised by its
local supervisors discriminated against the class on the basis of

31. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867-68.
32. Id. at 869.
33. Id. at 870 (quoting Nat'1 Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'1 Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
495 (1998)).
34. Id.
35. 411 F. App'x 226 (11th Cir. 2011).
36. Id. at 230.
37. 409 F. App'x 290 (11th Cir. 2011).
38. Id. at 294-95.
39. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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gender.40 On appeal, the district court's certification order was
substantially affirmed by a divided Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc.'
Before the Supreme Court, the issues were twofold: (1) whether the
plaintiffs' huge class met the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) whether the plaintiffs'
claims for back pay on behalf of the class could be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 2 In answering the
first question, the Court held that the commonality requirement had not
been met, although this aspect of the Court's decision was sharply
divided with the majority eking out a five-four decision." Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia concluded:
Here [the plaintiffs] wish to sue about literally millions of employment
decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for
all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims for relief will produce a common
answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored."
The majority noted that Wal-Mart's practice of granting discretion to
its local supervisors to make pay and promotion decisions actually
worked against the plaintiffs' claim of discriminatory company-wide
employment practices.4 ' Although the plaintiffs had attempted to make
this showing through the use of statistical and anecdotal evidence, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence fell "well short."
As to the second question, the Court unanimously concluded that the
plaintiffs' claims for back pay had been improperly certified under Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 ' The Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's "Trial by Formula" method of determining back
pay." According to this formula, a sample set of class members would
have been selected for determination by a special master, and the
percentage of claims determined by the master to be valid would then
have been applied to the entire class." Rejecting this "novel project,"
the Supreme Court found that Wal-Mart was "entitled to individualized

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 2547.
Id. at 2549.
See id. at 2547.
See id. at 2556-57, 2561.
Id. at 2552.
Id. at 2554-55.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2557, 2561.
Id. at 2561.
Id.
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determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay."50 Writing for
the dissent, Justice Ginsberg, while joining the Court's opinion as to the
back pay question under Rule 23(b)(2), disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the plaintiffs had not met the commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)." According to Justice Ginsberg, the plaintiffs' showing
of commonality was adequate to proceed, and the purported class should
not have been disqualified "at the starting gate.""
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes" easily was the most talked about
and written about case during the survey period. It certainly will
become one of those seminal cases cited by many future courts and will
be discussed for years to come. It also, no doubt, will prove to be a
significant hurdle for future plaintiffs to overcome in seeking to certify
Title VII class actions of any significant size.
Evidentiary Issues
Two unpublished opinions during the survey period concerned
evidentiary issues in affirming summary judgments for defendants. In
Henderson v. FedEx Express," the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the district court had relied upon inadmissible
hearsay evidence in granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment." The plaintiff had been fired for having another employee
clock in for him. In support of its defense that the plaintiff had been
fired for falsifying his time card, the defendant submitted the deposition
testimony of its managers, who had reviewed a videotape of the time
clock area. It was this evidence that the plaintiff argued was inadmissible hearsay." However, the court of appeals agreed with the district
court that the "[deposition] testimony was not hearsay because it was
based on the personal observations" of the defendant's managers, and
because it was submitted "as evidence of the decisionmakers' state of
mind at the time that they terminated [the plaintiff's] employment."
The evidentiary issue before the court in Young v. FedEx Express"
was the admissibility of an EEOC cause determination. The plaintiff
had brought an action pursuant to Title VII and Section 1981, alleging
C.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2560-61.
Id. at 2561-62 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id.
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
442 F. App'x 502 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 505.
432 F. App'x 915 (11th Cir. 2011).
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that he had been terminated on account of his race. The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that the district court had erroneously refused to
consider a cause determination that had been issued by the EEOC."
The Eleventh Circuit, acknowledging its prior precedent that EEOC
cause determinations are generally admissible pursuant to the hearsay
exception for public records, held that the district court nonetheless had
not abused its discretion in refusing to consider the cause determination
in this case."o According to the court of appeals, there was sufficient
evidence that the determination lacked trustworthiness because the copy
submitted to the court was unsigned, the determination did not specify
the basis for several of its conclusions, and the report contained nonbinding legal analysis in addition to its factual content.6

D. Remedies
1. Punitive Damages. Although an unpublished decision, Howell
v. Compass Group" is important for employers defending Title VII
punitive damage claims. At trial, the district court granted judgment as
a matter of law for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages." In doing so, the district court relied upon the Eleventh
Circuit's prior decision in Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." and
determined that the defendant's Director of Food Services "was not high
enough up the corporate ladder to impute liability for his actions to the
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, in light of the
company.""
Supreme Court's intervening decision in Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n 6 Dudley was no longer good law." However, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Dudley is still good law."
The Eleventh Circuit concluded as follows: "Dudley's high-enough-upthe-ladder or 'corporate hierarchy' requirement for an award of punitive
damages against a corporate employer is still good law and still binds

59. Id. at 916.
60. Id. at 917 (citing Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1995); Barfield v. Orange Cnty., 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990)).
61. Id. at 918.
62. 448 F. App'x 30 (11th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 32.
64. 166 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
65. Howell, 448 F. App'x at 37.
66. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
67. Howell, 448 F. App'x at 37.
68. Id. at 38.
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this Court. Kolstad only did away with the egregiousness requirement
for punitive damages.""
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Charge Questions
Kelly v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,"o an unpublished decision, resulted
in the vacation of a summary judgment that had been granted in favor
of the employer. In the proceeding below, Kelly alleged that he first
filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in June 2003 and then
filed a charge for a second time in February 2005. The only charge the
EEOC had on record, however, was another one that Kelly filed in
August 2007. Only the 2007 charge was marked as received by the
EEOC and assigned a charge number. The employer moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Kelly's untimely 2007 charge meant
he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court
agreed that the 2007 charge was untimely and, because equitable tolling
would not render it timely, granted the employer's motion." Based on
its review of the record on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
Kelly had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine question as
to whether he in fact had filed charges in 2003 and 2005.
On
remand, the district court was to "determine which of Kelly's allegations
relate to or grow out of the allegations in the 2003 questionnaire and
charge and whether any of [his] timely claims [had] merit."73

A.

B.

Gross And But For Causation
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer in Horn v. United Parcel Services, Inc." While Horn raised
a number of issues upon appeal, only the court's discussion of the impact
of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc." is worthy of note. The
Eleventh Circuit observed that in Gross, the Supreme Court "clarified
that a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause for [an]
adverse employment action in order to prevail" on an Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA)" claim under a disparate treatment

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (citations omitted).
457 F. App'x 804 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id.
433 F. App'x 788, 796 (11th Cir. 2011).
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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theory." Noting that the Eleventh Circuit had "yet to address the
effect of Gross on a court's summary judgment analysis in a single
motive ADEA case," the panel observed that "a majority of . .. sister

circuits . .. continue[] to rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework.""
Absent a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, it appears likely from
the panel's discussion that the Eleventh Circuit will join the majority of
its sister circuits on this question if it is ever asked to weigh in on this
question.
A month later, another panel also addressed the impact of Gross and
expressly relied on the McDonnell Douglas" framework to affirm the
grant of summary judgment for an employer.o In East v. Clayton
County,"' the former employee had not shown that he had been treated
less favorably than any younger similarly situated employee.82 The
court reasoned that "[slince the Supreme Court did not explicitly
overrule our precedent in applying the McDonnell Douglas test to ADEA
cases involving circumstantial evidence, we review East's claims under
both McDonnell Douglas and Gross."'
C. Prima Facie Case
1. Failure to Apply. In Howell v. Compass Group," a former
employee appealed in part the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of her former employer on her failure to promote
claim. The district court concluded that Howell could not establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination because she had never applied for
The court of appeals affirmed.86 Although
the position in question.'
the multi-factor analysis employed in failure to promote claims does not
expressly require a plaintiff to apply for promotion, the panel nevertheless concluded that to be an implicit prima facie requirement.87

77. Horn, 433 F. App'x at 793 (citing Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351).
78. Id. (citing Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010);
Anderson v. Durham D & M L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 523 (8th Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009); Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 622 (6th
Cir. 2009)).
79. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
80. East v. Clayton Cnty., 436 F. App'x 904 (11th Cir. 2011).
81. 436 F. App'x 904 (11th Cir. 2011).
82. Id. at 912.
83. Id. at 911.
84. 448 F. App'x 30 (11th Cir. 2011).
85. Id. at 32-33.
86. Id. at 39.
87. Id. at 34.
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To the same effect, in Gortemoller v. InternationalFurnitureMarketing, Inc.," the court of appeals held that an age discrimination plaintiff
must still demonstrate that he was replaced by a younger individual in
order to establish a prima facie ADEA claim." The court explained as
follows: "When Gortemoller was fired, [the] [diefendants streamlined
their product-design process . . .. While Evans-who [the] [dlefendants
employed for eight years leading up to Gortemoller's termination-oversees this streamlined process, he does not perform Gortemoller's former duties; no one in particular does . . . ."o
2. Failure to Comply with Progressive Discipline Policy. In
Ritchie v. Industrial Steel, Inc.,9" an employer's failure to adhere to its
own progressive discipline policy did not prevent the grant of summary
judgment in its favor.9 2 The plaintiff had been terminated from
employment for a variety of job performance issues, including an
accident he caused.9" The court of appeals noted as follows: "A plaintiff
can also show pretext by demonstrating that the employer did not follow
its normal procedures in terminating his employment." 94 It was
undisputed in the record that the employer did not follow its normal
procedures with respect to Ritchie." Nevertheless, the panel was
unpersuaded: "Finally, even assuming that the company did not comply
with its progressive discipline policy in terminating Ritchie, [the decision
maker] testified that the policy was not followed in every case.
Therefore, the company's failure to conform to the policy in Ritchie's case
does not establish pretext."9
D. Retaliation
Bradley v. Pfizer, Inc." presented the interesting question of whether
an employer's issuance of a litigation hold" constitutes retaliation.99

88. 434 F. App'x 861 (11th Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 862.
90. Id. at 863.
91. 426 F. App'x 867 (11th Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 868.
93. Id. at 870.
94. Id. at 873 (citing Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 1985)).
95. Id. at 874.
96. Id.
97. 440 F. App'x 805 (11th Cir. 2011).
98. Legal holds or litigation holds are directives from employers to employees to either
retain or turn over to the employer items of potential evidence when a claim arises that
could result in litigation.
99. 440 F. App'x at 809.
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After being notified that Bradley had filed a complaint of age discrimination with the EEOC, his employer placed a litigation hold on his
company-issued laptop and copied its contents. Bradley asserted that
those actions constituted retaliation. 00 The district court granted
summary judgment to Pfizer on this claim.'o The court of appeals
affirmed because litigation holds were common in the company whenever
it was faced with a potential lawsuit.102 In fact, Bradley acknowledged
that he had received about a dozen such notices during the time he was
employed by Pfizer.'
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT

While there was a noticeable uptick in Americans With Disability Act
(ADA)'04 cases on appeal during the survey period, they still constituted only a small portion of the employment discrimination cases reaching
the Eleventh Circuit. Only two decisions during the survey period are
worthy of note.
What Constitutes a Qualified Individual with a Disability?
Cremeens v. City of Montgomery'o presented a panel with a fitness
for duty question. Cremeens had formerly been a fire investigator with
the City of Montgomery. The district court determined that fire fighting
was an essential function of the fire investigator position and that the
physical fitness requirements for fire investigators were job related or
consistent with business necessity.'06 The panel affirmed, finding that
Cremeens proposed accommodation "-to work as a [fiire [i]nvestigator
without being required to fight fires-[was] not reasonable because it
would require the City to eliminate an essential job function from the
[flire [i]nvestigator position, which the ADA does not require it to
do.""' The court went on to hold that the physical fitness requirement

A.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 806.
102. Id. at 809.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
105. 427 F. App'x 855 (11th Cir. 2011).
106. Id. at 856. Discrimination under the ADA includes an employer's use of
qualification standards or employment tests that tend to screen out those individuals with
disabilitites, "unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with
business necessity." Id. at 858; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
107. Cremeens, 427 F. App'x at 858.
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for fire investigators was job related and consistent with business
necessity.'o
What Constitutes an Adverse Employment Action?
Tarmas v. Secretary of the Navy.ce provides some further instruction
on what constitutes an actionable adverse employment action. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary on
Tarmas's discrimination and retaliation claims. Tarmas cited several
employer actions as the basis of his claims. These included a callout
requirement, a denial of a leave request, and a letter of caution he
received from his employer."o The court concluded that none of these
actions caused serious or material changes to Tarmas's working
conditions and thus were not adverse employment actions."' In
support of his retaliation claim, Tarmas referred only to an email he
received citing his poor job performance on a particular occasion." 2
Again, the Court concluded that this was not a materially adverse
action."'
B.

IV. REHABILITATION ACT
Morales v. Georgia Department of Human Resourcesn4 was the only
noteworthy case arising under the Rehabilitation Act"' decided during
the survey period. Morales, a former employee of the State of Georgia,
sued her former employer under the Rehabilitation Act."' She was
not a federal employee. The district court dismissed Morales's wrongful
termination claim under the Rehabilitation Act on the ground that she
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before commencing
her civil action."' However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court erred by dismissing her claim on that basis, noting that while
"[p]rivate actions against federal government employers under the
[Rehabilitation] Act . . . must satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of

administrative remedies in the manner prescribed .. . an action against
a non-federal employer under the Rehabilitation Act does not require

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
433 F. App'x 754 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 758.
Id. at 762.
See id. at 757.
Id. at 763.
446 F. App'x 179 (11th Cir. 2011).
5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
Morales, 446 F. App'x at 180.
Id. at 180-81.
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exhaustion of administrative remedies."" 8 The court of appeals was
nonetheless able to affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment on other grounds."'
V. SECTION 1981
A.

Direct Evidence
Ash v. yson Foods, Inc. (Ash V)12O again commanded the attention
of the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period. The last opinion
issued in this case, Ash IV,12 ' was rendered in 2010.122 After the Ash
IV opinion was issued, one of the parties filed a petition for rehearing en
banc, which was subsequently granted. 2 3 The court vacated its earlier
Ash IV opinion in favor of the new opinion rendered during this survey
period."
One issue in the latest proceeding concerned the sufficiency of the
evidence introduced at trial of the plaintiffs' failure to promote discrimination claims.'2 5 In part, the evidence presented to the jury below was
testimony that on two occasions the decision maker used the word "boy"
when referring to African-American male employees.' 26 Tyson argued
that the evidence presented, including the use of that term, was still
insufficient to support the jury's finding of discrimination as to one of
the plaintiffs, Hithon." In a lengthy analysis, the court rejected the
argument:
Instead, we consider all of the evidence cumulatively, viewing it in the
light most favorable to Hithon, to determine whether it is enough for
a reasonable jury to have found that Tyson discriminated against
Hithon based on race by promoting Dade to the shift manager position.
As we have discussed, there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury
to have found pretextual Tyson's proferred race-neutral reason of
wanting a shift manager who had not been in management at the
failing plaint; to have found that there was a written job requirement
of three to five years experience in the poultry business, which Hithon
118. Id. at 181 (second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
119. Id.
120. 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011).
121. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (Ash IV), 392 F. App'x 817 (11th Cir. 2010).
122. Ash, 774 F.3d at 886.
123. Id. at 887.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 892.
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met but Dade did not; to have found that there was also an unwritten
job requirement of experience in first and second processing, which
Hithon met but Dade did not; and to have found that Hatley, the
decision maker, used the word "boy" in a racially demeaning way to
refer to Hithon and another African-American male employee on two
occasions just before the decision was made.
In light of all of the evidence, we cannot say that "the facts and
inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that
reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict." 2 "

B. PrimaFacie Case
1. Sometimes No Comparator is Needed.

As discussed earlier in

this Article, in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,129 the district court
granted summary judgment to Lockheed-Martin due to Smith's failure
to identify a similarly situated black supervisor comparator. 13 0
Vacating and remanding, the court reinstated both Smith's Title VII'
and Section 1981132 claims.' 33

2. And Sometimes You Do.

In Summers v. City of Dothan,"' the

plaintiff, a former police officer, was terminated from employment after
she was found to have committed two major offenses of noncompliance
with police regulations.'
The court concluded that her comparators
were improper because the decision makers did not know about them
when they disciplined the plaintiff.3 1
3. The Comparators Must be Different. In the final interesting
comparator case, Edmond v. University of Miami,"7 the plaintiff tried
to prove his case by pointing to the behavior of individuals who shared
his race and national origin. 3 8 The court of appeals concluded that
Edmond had "failed to identify an appropriate similarly situated
individual"; specifically,

128. Id. at 897-98 (quoting Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
129. 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
130. Id. at 1326.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
133. Lockheed-Martin, 644 F.3d at 1347.
134. 444 F. App'x 346 (11th Cir. 2011).
135. Id. at 348.
136. Id. at 350.
137. 441 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2011).
138. Id. at 722.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1218

[Vol. 63

Edmond identifies only one such person who he argues is such a
similarly situated individual. Yet this individual, although employed
in the same job as was Edmond, also shares his race and national
origin. She is thus not "outside of his classification" for purposes of
establishing the prima facie case." 9
Summary judgment was affirmed. 4 0
C. Adverse Employment Action
Blue v. Dunn Construction Co.'41 presented the question of whether
a delayed promotion constitutes an adverse employment action. 142
Affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under
the facts of this particular case, it did not. 4' While recognizing that
this precise question has not yet been decided in this circuit, the court
stated as follows: "We have determined that an 'adverse employment
action' includes 'termination, failure to hire, or demotion"' and that "taln
employer's conduct falling short of those actions 'must, in some
substantial way, alter the employee's compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, deprive him or her of employment44
opportunities, or adversely affect his or her status as an employee."'
The court also noted that "[wlith regard to the level of substantiality
required, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he 'suffered a serious and
material4 5 change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-

ment.""1

Because the employer did not have a company policy about the length
of the evaluation period prior to promotion, the court concluded that
Blue was unable to show an unreasonable delay in promoting him based
on a deviation from company policy.'46 The panel found that Blue was
an acting foreman for only a few months longer than two white acting
48
foremen.147 Summary judgment was affirmed.1

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 725-26.
453 F. App'x 881 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 884 (quoting Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970-71 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 886.
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SECTION 1983

FirstAmendment
The United States Supreme Court decision in Borough of Duryea v.
4 s vacated a First Amendment Petition Clause5 0 claim
Guarnieri
brought pursuant to § 19831" by the plaintiff.'"'
Expanding on
principles first announced in Garcetti v. Ceballos,'5 the Supreme
Court concluded that a government employer's alleged retaliatory actions
against an employee do not give rise to Petition Clause liability unless
the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern. 154
Holding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
erroneously concluded that the matter of public concern test does not
apply in Petition Clause cases, the Court reversed and remanded for
further proceeding.'"'

A.

B.

TransgenderDiscrimination
In Glenn v. Brumby,"' perhaps the most controversial decision
rendered during the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
gender discrimination ruling in favor of a transgendered individual.5 7
Glenn was born a male. Since puberty, Glenn had felt that she was a
woman.'5 8 In 2005, she was diagnosed with gender identity disorder
and "began to take steps to transition from male to female under the
supervision of health care providers.""' This process included living
outside of the workplace as a woman, a prerequisite to sex assignment
surgery.16 0 In October 2005, the Georgia General Assembly's Office of
Legislative Council hired Glenn for an editor position. In 2006, Glenn
informed her direct supervisor that she was in the process of becoming
a woman. For Halloween in 2006 Office of Legislative Council employees were permitted to come to work wearing costumes, and Glenn came

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
U.S. CONsT. amend I.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2501.
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Guarnieri,131 S. Ct. at 2501.
Id.
663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id.
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to work dressed as a woman. When Brumby, the head of the Office of
Legislative Council, saw Glenn, he told her that her appearance was not
appropriate and dismissed her for the day. Following this incident,
Brumby met with Glenn's supervisor to discuss Glenn's appearance on
Halloween and was informed that Glenn intended to undergo gender
transition.16 1
In the fall of 2007, Glenn informed her supervisor that she was
changing her legal name and would begin coming to work as a woman. 6 2 The supervisor notified Brumby who thereupon terminated
Glenn's employment.'6 3 Brumby stated that "Glenn's intended gender
transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some
people would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make Glenn's
coworkers uncomfortable."' 64 Glenn sued Brumby alleging discriminaBoth parties moved for
tion under the Equal Protection Clause.'
summary judgment."' The district court granted summary judgment
to Glenn on her sex discrimination claim and granted summary
judgment to Brumby on Glenn's medical discrimination claim. Both
sides appealed."' Affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Glenn, the Eleventh Circuit opined that there was
no need to address Glenn's cross appeal because she was already
provided with all the relief she sought.' The court reasoned that
[aill persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype. For example, courts have
held that plaintiffs cannot be discriminated against for wearing jewelry
that is considered too effeminate, carrying a serving tray too gracefully,
or taking too active a role in child-rearing. An individual cannot be
punished because of his or her perceived gender-nonconformity.
Because these protections are afforded to everyone, they cannot be
denied to a transgender individual. The nature of the discrimination
is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and discrimination
on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination that is subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Ever since the
Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314.
Id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1321.
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classifications, its consistent purpose has been to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes.169
To that end, the court rejected Brumby's claim that he fired Glenn
because he was concerned the other women in the office might object to
The court held that terminating of a transGlenn's restroom use.'
gendered public employee violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition of sex-based discrimination if the basis for termination is due
to gender stereotyping that is not substantially related to a significant
government interest."' Notably, the court stated in dicta that a
similar rationale could apply in the private employment context because
Title VII 2 also prohibits discrimination against individuals who fail
to conform to socially prescribed gender roles."' This ruling appears
to open the door for Title VII expansion.
C. Punitive Damages
In Sepulveda v. Burnside,"' the Eleventh Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court's denial of the a defendant's motion to set
aside or reduce a punitive damages award."' The plaintiff, a former
prison inmate, sued multiple defendants, including a detention officer,
alleging First 6 and Eighth Amendment"' violations.s A jury
found in favor of the inmate. It awarded one dollar in compensatory
damages and $999,999 in punitive damages. 9 The court's discussion
concerning the proper due process analysis of a punitive damage award
is instructive for purposes of § 1983 jurisprudence generally.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The 2011 survey year again presented some noteworthy and factually
interesting employment discrimination cases for decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court. Unpublished decisions continue to be guideposts for
judicial disposition in the Circuit. The immediate availability of

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1318-19 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1321.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316.
432 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 867.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
Sepulveda, 432 F. App'x at 861.
Id.
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unpublished decisions, alongside published ones, due to the evolution of
electronic reporting is a new source of guidance for practioners.

